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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §78-2a-3, as an appeal from a final 
Order entered in a civil proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented by this Appeal include: 
1. Did the Trial Court commit reversible error by 
entering an Order modifying the Decree of Divorce which had been 
entered in this matter based upon a finding that the Plaintiff 
did fail to disclose his true income to Defendant at the time the 
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parties entered into a Stipulation, and that the Defendant was 
not aware of Plaintiff's income when she agreed to accept $250,00 
per month as child support for the minor child of the parties, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on 
June 30, 1983. 
2. A Modification Order was entered on April 11, 1986, 
directing the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant the sum of $250.00 
per month as and for child support for the minor child of the 
parties. 
3. On April 19, 1988, the Defendant filed a Petition 
for Modification of Decree of Divorce alleging that the income of 
the Plaintiff has increased substantially since entry of the 
Modification Order and that he is better able to provide a 
greater sum as child support for the benefit of the minor child 
of the parties. 
4. The matter was tried to the Court on February 14, 
1989. On March 20, 1989, the Court entered an Order Modifying 
the Decree of Divorce to award the Defendant $750.00 per month as 
child support and entering a Judgment in favor of the Defendant 
for $2,000.00 in attorney's fees. 
5. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order 
Modifying the Decree of Divorce and Judgment on April 19, 1989. 
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6. Plaintiff filed a Brief in this matter on September 
6, 1989- The Court entered an Order allowing the Defendant an 
extension of time until November 4, 1989, in which to file 
Respondent's Brief in this matter• 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Decree of Divorce entered in this matter on June 
30, 1983, directed the Plaintiff to pay $175-00 per month as 
child support for the benefit of the minor child of the parties* 
[R 19] 
2. On January 7, 1985, the Defendant filed a Motion to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce seeking an increase of child sup-
port. [R 22] 
3. The Plaintiff filed a Counter-Request for 
Modification seeking a change in rights of visitation with the 
parties1 minor child. [R 54] 
4. The Petitions of each of the parties were argued to 
the Domestic Relations Commissioner of the Third District Court 
on June 20, 1985. The Commissioner entered a Recommendation that 
Defendant's Petition to increase child support should be denied 
because there was not a substantial change in circumstance since 
entry of the Decree of Divorce. [R 62] 
5. The Defendant rejected the Recommendation of the 
Commissioner and a hearing was held before the Court on July 18, 
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1985. At that hearing before the Court evidence was presented 
that the Plaintiff's income before federal and state tax was 
$2,213.00 per month. [R 66 and R 48] Plaintiff also presented 
evidence that his net income after tax and expenses was $513.76 
per month. [R 66 and R 49] Finally, Plaintiff presented evi-
dence that his income after personal expenses was a negative 
figure of $665.19. [R 66 and R 50] 
6. Following the hearing the Court entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on January 14, 1986, finding that 
the Plaintiff's gross income at the time of the divorce was 
$2,213.12 per month and that his income at the time of the 
hearing was $2,131.58 per month. [R 68] Based upon those fin-
dings the Court concluded that there had not been a material 
change of circumstance. [R 69] 
7. The Court entered its Order on January 14, 1986, 
denying Defendant's Motion to modify the provisions in the Decree 
of Divorce with respect to increasing child support. [R 72] On 
April 11, 1986, a Stipulation for Modification was filed with the 
Clerk of the Court providing that the Plaintiff would pay the 
Defendant $250.00 per month as child support and further pro-
viding that beginning with the month of September, 1987, child 
support would be increased to $300.00 per month. [R 7 3 and R 74] 
The Stipulation of the parties also contained a provision 
stating: 
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The parties acknowledged that this Stipulation is 
based upon circumstances of each party as they presently 
exist • . . [R 75] 
Pursuant In I lu« innis nil I he ,;l ipul.il inn I Iin I'uuit 
entered a Modification Order on April 11, 1986, directing that 
child support would be increased :: M.00 per month, that 
beginning with the month of September i 7 clii ] d suppoi : !:  would 
be increased to $300.00 per month, and that the Order is based 
upon circumstances as they presently exist. [R 76 through 78] 
9. The Plaintiff filed a Petition for Modification of 
Divorce Decree on May 18 19 87, seeking a change of custody of 
the parties" minor child. [R 79] On September 11, 1987, an 
Order was entered dismissing the Plaintiff's Petition for 
Modification. [R 98] 
i • *>? *v. i- : f j 1 eci a Petj ti on 
for Modification of Decree of Divorce which alleged a substantial 
change of circumstance since the entry of the Modification Order 
and prayed for an j ncrease of ch :ii 1 d si Ippor f: asked that th e par-
ties share equally in any and all uninsured medical expenses for 
the minor child and asking for an award of attorney's fees. [R 
1 2 1 1 :! 1:1:01 ijigl: ] 23] 
11. The Plaintiff1s Petition was tried before the 
Court on February 14, 1989. [R 154] 
12. The Defendant testified . it : br. i al that the Plaintiff 
approached her in approximately August or September of 1985, 
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following the hearing which had taken place in July, 1985, and 
the Plaintiff told the Defendant that he knew she needed more 
money and that he would give her more money if she would give him 
the tax exemption for their minor child. [Trans. P.5, L.2 
through P.6, L.19] 
13. A verbal agreement setting out the parameters of 
the Stipulation which was entered by the Court on April 11, 1986, 
was reached by the parties some time during September or October, 
1985. [Trans. P.11, L.5 through L.22] The Defendant 
commenced to pay the increased child support in October, 1985. 
[Trans. P.7, L.20 through P.9, L.18] 
14. At the time the parties entered into the 
Stipulation to increase child support, the Defendant was not 
aware of the Plaintiff's income and believed that the Plaintiff's 
income was the same as he had represented to the Court during the 
proceedings in July, 1985. [Trans. P.17, L.6 though L.13] 
The Defendant provided no information regarding his income at the 
time the parties entered into the Stipulation either by a verbal 
affirmation or by providing any documentation of his income. 
[Trans. P.17, L.14 through P.18, L.9; Trans. P.26, L.10 through 
L.13] 
15. At the time the parties entered into the 
Stipulation to modify the payment of child support in 1986, the 
Plaintiff was earning approximately $9,000.00 per month as gross 
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income. The Plaintiff testified at trial that he told the 
Defendant he was making $8-10,000.00 per month* [Trans. P.47, 
L.12 througl 1 L.23] The Plaintii* - testified that the 
discussions which resulted in the Stipulation to increase support 
in 1986, began in September ' * approximately one month after 
the parties . *M -\ . * .ef end ant " '. I }e t;1t j on I «'»t 
Modification had been denied. [Trans. P.48, L.12 through 
L.18] 
16 . During the tri a I , the Coi n: t a Inii tted Defendant s 
Exhibit "24", a copy of the Plaintiff's tax return for 1985. 
Plaintiff's 1935 tax return showed a monthly income of $3,405.00 
per month [Trans. P. 52, I., 1 0 through P. 53 , I.. 3 ] 
The Court admitted the document to show the disparity between 
what Plaintiff claimed as income at the time of trial in July, 
1985 and his actual income as shown on his 1985 tax return. 
[Trans. P.54, L.16 through L.22] 
Tin1! l' I .i i ntiff admitted in *nss-examJ nation that 
the Findings of Fact and the Order entered 1n January, 1986, was 
not an accurate statement of the Plaintiff's income at that time. 
[Trans P. 0, L.4 through L.7] 
18. At the time of trial on Defendant's Petition for 
Modification, February 14, 1989, the Plaintiff's income was 
$6,000 
19. The Plaintiff at no time disclosed his income to 
the Defendant when the parties entered into the Stipulation to 
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increase child support. [Trans. P.88, L.13 through P.89 
L.7] 
20. Counsel for the Defendant was never involved in 
negotiations which resulted in the increase in child support, no 
Petition was before the Court and no discovery was undertaken. 
Counsel for Defendant simply drafted an agreement which was for-
warded to counsel for the Plaintiff and subsequently modified to 
include the provision that the Stipulation was based upon the 
circumstances as they presently existed. [Dep. of Glen M. 
Richman, February 7, 1989, admitted into evidence, Trans. P.29, 
L.12 through P.31, L.12] 
21. At the conclusion of the trial, counsel for the 
Defendant made a motion pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 15(b), to modify the pleadings to conform to the 
evidence presented to the Court asking the Court to amend the 
existing Orders based upon misrepresentations to the Court, 
misrepresentations to the Defendant and material ommissions of 
fact by the Plaintiff by causing the Defendant to enter into the 
Stipulation which became the Modification Order of April 11, 
1986. [Trans. P.91, L.2 through L.13] 
22. The Court entered its Findings of Fact that the 
Plaintiff's obligation to pay support for the minor child of the 
parties was modified by Order dated April 11, 1986, increasing 
the child support from $175.00 per month to $250.00 per month. 
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The Court then found that there had been no material change in 
circumstance regarding Plaintiff's income. However, the Court 
found: 
Number 3. The most reasonable and credible 
assessment of the testimony of the parties is that the 
Plaintiff did fail to disclose his true income to the 
Defendant at the time the parties entered into the 
Stipulation and that Defendant was not aware of 
Plaintiff1s income when she agreed to accept $250.00 per 
month as child support for the minor child of the 
parties. 
Number 4. The Plaintifffs income at the time the 
parties entered into the agreement and his present 
income is in the amount of $6,000.00 per month. 
The Court then concluded that there had been no material 
change of circumstance but that Plaintiff's failure to disclose 
his true income was a material ommission of fact. The Court then 
concluded that child support should be increased pursuant to the 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines which were applicable at the 
time of trial. [R 166 through 168] 
23. The Court entered its Order modifying the Decree 
of Divorce directing the Plaintiff to pay to the Defendant the 
sum of $750.00 per month as child support, directed the Plaintiff 
to maintain health insurance, awarding the Plaintiff the right to 
claim the minor child as a tax return and awarding the Defendant 
$2,000.00 in attorney's fees. [R 170 through 171] 
-9-
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 52(a), the 
Appellate Court should defer to the Trial Court's determination 
of the credibility witnesses. The Trial Court Judge was in the 
best position to observe the litigants in person and measure 
their credibility. Absent a showing of clear error, the 
Appellant must rely upon the credibility given to each of the 
witnesses by the Trial Court. 
The Trial* Court in measuring the credibility of the wit-
nesses in this matter determine that the Plaintiff had failed to 
be honest in his negotiations to establish child support when the 
parties agreed to a Modification in April, 19 86, that the 
Plaintiff had either misrepresented his income or failed to 
disclose his income and that such misrepresetations or ommissions 
were material to the ability of the parties to reach a fair 
settlement. The Court allowed Modification of the Petition pur-
suant to Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
allege fraud upon the Court by material ommission and amended the 
Order of April 11, 1986, upon those grounds rather than upon a 
showing of a substantial change of material circumstance. 
At the time the parties entered into the Stipulation and 
Modification Order of April 11, 1986, there was no action pending 
before the Court, no discovery was undertaken and counsel for the 
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Defendant was involved only for the purpose of drafting an 
agreement reached between the parties without the assistance of 
counsel. There was no bona fide representation of the Defendant 
by counsel for the purpose of determining Plaintiff's income. 
The Court errored in awarding the Plaintiff the tax 
exemption for the minor child of the parties. 
Plaintiff's Appeal in this matter is without merit and 
not brought in good faith. It is reasonable that the Defendant 
should be awarded such attorney's fees and costs as she may incur 
in defending this Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONTINUING EQUITABLE JURISDICTION 
TO ADJUST THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES ENCOMPASSES THE 
POWER TO AMEND THE DECREE BASED UPON TACIT FRAUD 
RELATING TO MR. GATES' CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION. 
The primary thrust of Mr. Gates' Argument on Appeal, is 
that he made a good deal for himself in 1986 by failing to 
disclose to his wife that he was making $3,000.00 per month more 
than at the time they were before the Court in May, 19 85, and the 
Court should enforce his tacit fraud upon his wife, child and the 
Court, because "there is no change in circumstances" from the 
time of entry of the Stipulation Order to the date of the 
hearing. Mr. Gates' position is no more than a tautological 
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argument with a false premise: "I made an agreement for a stated 
amount in 1986 based upon my income as it then existed. Since my 
income hasnft changed, my agreement is still good." The false 
premise is that equity will tolerate nondisclosure of the true 
facts upon which a rational decision should have been made, espe-
cially where the detriment flowing from the dishonesty directly 
deprives a person not a party to the "deal" from his statutory 
entitlement, i.e., Mr. Gates1 child. 
A. Principles of Review of Modification Proceedings. 
The basic principles upon which an Appellate Court reviews a 
Trial Court's divorce modification proceedings are well defined 
in the case of Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d, 1297, 1299 
(Utah 1981) : 
"The modification of Divorce Decrees is 
a matter of equity, and it is the duty and 
perogative of this Court to review both the 
facts and the law. (Citations omitted) 
However, it is likewise true that on review 
this Court will accord considerable 
deference to the judgment of the Trial Court 
due to its advantage position and will not 
disturb the action of that Court unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates to the 
contrary, or the Trial Court abuses its 
discretion or misapplies principles of law." 
(Citations omitted) 
Further, an Appellate Court may affirm a Trial Court's 
decision on proper grounds even though different than those 
relied upon by the Trial Court. Branch v. Western Petroleum, 
Inc., 657 P.2d, 267, 276 (Utah 1982) 
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B. Utah Legal Principles Regarding Child Support 
Obligations. The Utah Legislature, and Courts of the State of 
Utah, have considered as primary the parental obligation of sup-
port when addressing divorcing parties and their children's 
rights. 
"The Utah Legislature has clearly stated 
the public policy of the State of Utah is 
that 'Children shall be maintained from the 
resources of responsible parents, thereby 
relieving or avoiding, at least in part, the 
burden of [support] often borne by the 
general citizenry through welfare programs.' 
Citing, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-b-l.l (1987); 
Peterson v. Peterson, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 
28 (1988). 
As stated in Martinez v. Martinez, 748 P.2d, 593, 595, 
(Utah App. 1988): 
"Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3, -4 (1987) 
established the obligation of both parents to 
support their children and '[a] child's right 
to that support is paramount.' Citing, 
Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d, 393, 394 
(Utah 1985) 'The Utah Supreme Court con-
tinued, 'the Trial Court may fashion such 
equitable Orders in relation to the children 
and their support as is reasonable and 
necessary, considering not only the needs of 
the children, but also the ability of the 
parent to pay.' 
In Race v. Race, 740 P.2d, 253, 255 (Utah 1988) the 
Court again underscored the importance of the child's rights when 
it stated: 
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"Although the awarding of visitation and 
child support is within the Court's discre-
tion, the Court must consider the child's 
paramount right to and need for his parents 
support. (Citation omitted) The 
Court-Ordered child support is an obligation 
imposed for the benefit of the children, not 
the divorcing spouse." 
Finally, the Utah Supreme in Lord v. Shaw, 682, P.2d, 
853, (Utah 1984), the broad equitable power of a Trial court 
relating to child support stated: 
"In matters concerning the custody and 
support of children, because of their highly 
equitable nature, it is appropriate for the 
Trial Court to take into consideration the 
entire circumstances in making any order of 
enforcement of.the decree, by contempt or 
otherwise having in mind his equitable powers, 
to make any adjustments he may think fair and 
justified." Lord v. Shaw, at 856. 
C. The Court's Increase in Child Support is an 
Appropriate Exercise of its Equitable Powers. The Court 
increase of Mr. Gates' child support obligation was a wise and 
appropriate use of the broad equitable discretion vested in Trial 
Courts to insure the welfare of children based upon their 
parents' ability to care for them. The Trial Court chose not to 
tolerate Mr. Gates' active omission when seeking and receiving a 
Court-Ordered increase of child support based upon nondisclosure 
of his true income. Mrs. Gates believes, and after a review of 
the record it is clearly appropriate, that the Court should have 
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increased the child support and made it retroactive to January, 
1986 when Mr. Gates began making $6,000.00 per month. As stated 
in Race v. Race, supra, child support is an obligation imposed 
for the benefit of the child not the divorcing spouse. In this 
instance, the child has been deprived of three years of increased 
child support benefits to which the child was entitled. We 
believe it is appropriate that this Court consider that issue on 
appeal, i.e., making the increased child support retroactive to 
1986 for the benefit of Mr. Gates1 child. 
The Argument made on appeal by Mr. Gates is similar to 
the argument rejected by the Court in Druce v. Druce, 7 38, P.2d, 
633 (Utah 1987). In Druce, the District Court entered a Temporary 
Order of Child Support prior to the final Decree. At the time of 
the final Decree, Mr. Druce was in arrears $1,200.00 on the 
Temporary Order. However, the final Decree did not require that 
Mr, Druce pay the amounts that were delinquent at the time of 
entry of the final Order. Subsequently, Mrs. Druce obtained a 
Judgment for the delinquent child support payments which had 
accrued to the date of entry of the final Divorce Decree. Mr. 
Druce appealed, asserting that the Temporary Support Order had 
merged into the final Decree and since the final Decree was 
silent on the delinquent temporary support payments the doctrine 
of res judicata precluded Plaintiff from seeking unpaid amounts. 
Affirming the lower court's judgment, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
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"We recognize that a few jurisdictions 
have adopted the Rule advocated by the 
Defendant. (Citations omitted) However, we 
disagree with those decisions. A rule that 
denies recovery of accrued unpaid obligations 
under a Temporary Order, unless they are 
expressly observed by the final Order are 
'entirely senseless . . . [because] 
it awards the recalcitrant husband for non-
compliance with the Court's Order by excusing 
him from payment of arrears.1 H. Clark, Law 
of Domestic Relations, Section 14.2, at 428 
(1968)." Druce v. Druce at 634. 
This Court may also uphold the Lower Court's decision 
based upon a reformation of contract theory. Paragraph 6 
(R.75) of the Stipulation Modifying the Decree of Divorce entered 
into April 10, 1986, states: 
"The parties acknowledge that this 
Stipulation is based upon circumstances of 
each party as they presently exist and, sub-
ject to the Court's approval, the Divorce 
Decree and subsequent Orders may be modified 
upon this Stipulation and subject to its terms 
being incorporated therein." 
It is clear that both parties intended the Stipulation 
to reflect their current circumstances. Mrs. Gates believed that 
Mr. Gates' income was not greater than at the time of the May, 
1985 hearing, which she believed to be $2,300.00, rather than 
$6,000.00, per month. Recently, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
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that a unilateral mistake may be a basis for reformation to con-
form the agreement to what both parties intended. Guardian 
State Bank v. Stangl, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (1989). The equitable 
remedy of reformation would be an appropriate remedy to benefit Mr. 
Gates1 child who has been deprived of his father's increased 
bounty the last three years by his fatherfs unconscionable 
bargaining. 
The Court's equitable powers were exercised in favor of 
a reasonable and just decision which takes into consideration Mr. 
Gatesf current income and reflects the appropriate amount under 
the Child Support Guidelines which he should be paying. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURTfS ASSESSMENT WHEN JUDGING 
CREDIBILITY OF THE PARTIES SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED 
ON APPEAL. 
Mr. Gates erroneously claims that there were no 
misrepresentations which would act as a basis for modification. 
In reply to this erroneous statement, the legal principle is that 
the Trial Court sat through a one-day trial listening to the 
testimony, receiving exhibits and examining the facts. As 
recently stated by this Court: 
"Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
52(a), we defer to the Trial Court's deter-
mination of the credibility of witnesses. We 
see no reason in the record to disagree with 
the Judgment of the Trial Court Judge, who was 
in the arena and observed the combatants in 
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person." Johnson v. Johnson, Utah Adv. Rep. 
22, 24 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
The following evidence was received during the hearing: 
a) Mrs. Gates, at the time of entering into the 
Stipulation to increase child support, believed that Mr. Gates1 
income was the same as he had represented to the Court in July, 
1985. [Trans. P.17, L.6 through L.13] 
b) Mr. Gates provided no information to Mrs. Gates 
regarding his income either verbally or by documentation when 
they entered into the Stipulation. [Trans. P.17, L.14 through 
P.18, L.9] 
c) Mr. Gates testified that the discussions which 
resulted in the Stipulation to increase child support in 1986 
began in September, 1985, approximately one month after the par-
ties had been in Court on Mrs. Gates' Petition to Modify. 
[Trans. P.48, L.12 through L.18] 
d) Mr. Gates testified at the time of trial that he was 
making approximately $8-10,000.00 per month and that he allegedly 
told Mrs. Gates the figure. [Trans. P.47, L.12 through L.23] 
e) The Court admitted Mr. Gates1 tax returns for 1985 
showing that he had a monthly income of $3,405.00 per month, 
showing that he earned $1,200.00 per month more than what he 
claimed in the July, 1985 hearing. [Trans. P.52, L.10 through 
P.53, L.3] 
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f) Mr. Gates admitted in cross-examination that the 
Findings of Fact and Order entered January, 1986, was not an 
accurate statement of his income at the time. [Trans. P.70, L.4 
through L.7] 
g) Counsel for Mrs. Gates was never involved in nego-
tiations which resulted in the increase in child support; counsel 
for Mr. Gates simply drafted an agreement which was forwarded to 
counsel for Mrs. Gates and subsequently modified to include the 
provision that the Stipulation was based upon circumstances as 
they presently existed. [Dep. of Glen M. Richman, Feb. 7, 1989, 
Trans. P.29, L.12 through P.31, L.12] 
There is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the Trial Court's conclusion that Mr. Gates was lying and that 
Mrs. Gates was duped into an agreement which did not take into 
consideration the true facts as they then existed. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN AWARDING MR. GATES THE 
TAX EXEMPTION FOR THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILD. 
Paragraph 3 of the Court's Order Modifying Decree of 
Divorce and Judgment grants Mr. Gates, the noncustodial parent, 
the tax exemption for the parties' minor child. The Trial 
Court's award of the tax exemption to Mr. Gates violates the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution in light of the 1982 
Tax Reform Act and its effect on 26 UCS, Section 152(e)(1988). 
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The Trial Courtfs award of the tax exemption to Mr. Gates is 
contrary to Federal law and Utah's interpretation of the general 
requirement imposed by Section 152(e) of the Internal Revenue 
Service Code. (See Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d, 69, 72 (Utah 
App. 1988) and Fulmer v. Fulmer, 761 P.2d, 942, 950 (Utah App. 
1988) 
The Trial Court was without jurisdiction to enter an 
Order contrary to the plain provisions of Internal Revenue 
Service Code. While the issue was not appealed, it is 
appropriate for this Court's remedial power to address the error. 
IV 
THE COURT SHOULD AWARD MRS. GATES COSTS REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DEFENDING THIS APPEAL. 
Under Rule 33(a) and 40(a) of the Rule of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, this Court has the power to award costs and attor-
ney's fees to Mrs. Gates for defending a "frivolous" appeal. 
Porco v. Porco, 752, P.2d, 365 (Utah App. 1988) The basis for 
the award is the clear deception which Mr. Gates foisted on Mrs. 
Gates and the Trial Court and, despite the Court's unequivocal 
ruling on the point. Mr. Gates continued misuse of the Utah Court 
system should not be tolerated by this Court. Mrs. Gates was 
required to expend considerable monies in proving Mr. Gates had 
failed to be honest. Mrs. Gates is again in the position of 
spending significant sums on attorney's fees to prove the same 
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point. Under these circumstances, this Court should award costs 
and attorney's fees to Mrs. Gates. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gates1 attempt to hide behind legal principles which 
protect legitimate interests of divorcing parties while 
approaching the matter with clearly "unclean hands" should to be 
condoned by this, or any other Court. The Trial Court saw 
through the veil of deceit which Mr. Gates actively wove around 
his wife, disenfranchising their child from the benefits of 
increased child support from 1986 through 1989. While Mr. Gates' 
ommissions when entering into the Stipulation with his wife in 
1986 may not fit into any clear-cut, square-pegged legal theory 
upon which redress is available, the Court's exercise of its 
broad equitable powers increasing the child support to a legal 
which is commensurate with Mr. Gates' current income, produces the 
most equitable result when considering the primacy of Mr. Gates' 
support obligation to his child. 
DATED this Q day of November, 1989. 
LITTLEFIELD &-^ PETERSON 
39669 39673 
PAJJL WOOD 
^Attorneys for Respondent 
-21-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ££?c~~~aay of November, 
1989, I caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be served upon John S. Adams and Robert M. 
Taylor, TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE, 5525 South 900 East, Suite 
200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117. 
